In this paper we explore the impact of imitation rules on players' long-run behaviors in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games. All players sit sequentially and equally spaced around a circle. Players are assumed to interact only with their neighbors, and to imitate either their successful neighbors and/or themselves or the successful actions taken by their neighbors and/or themselves. In the imitating-successful-player dynamics, full defection is the unique long-run equilibrium as the probability of players' experimentations (or mutations) tend to 0. By contrast, full cooperation could emerge in the long run under the imitating-successful-action dynamics. Moreover, it is discovered that the convergence rate to equilibrium under local interaction could be slower than that under global interaction.
Introduction
Whether (full) cooperation can be sustained in repeatedly played prisoner's dilemma (PD) games interests many researchers. Several approaches have been explored to achieve the cooperation goal. The folk theorem, assuming that players are longsightedly rational, has been shown to be effective in this subject. More precisely, the folk theorem shows that cooperative payoff could be achieved by some equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient. Evolutionary games with boundedly rational players are promising approaches as well. Nevertheless, whether players will eventually cooperate would depend on how to set players' boundedly rational behaviors. For instance, through the aspiration-level adjustment over periods based on realized payoffs, Karandikar et al. (1998) and Palomino and Vega-Redondo (1999) showed that cooperation is possible in the long run among two players and a continuum of players, respectively. In the replicator dynamics, Bergstrom and Stark (1993) , Nowak and Sigmund (1995) , and Wiseman and Yilankaya (2001) proved that cooperation among a continuum of players could emerge in the long run.
Oppositely, cooperation is impossible under the Darwinian-type dynamics studied in Kandori et al. (1993) and Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996) . In Kandori et al. (1993) individuals play with all other players, while players are randomly paired to play the game multiple rounds per
The intuition behind different outcomes under the two imitation rules mentioned above is as follows. The force deviating from cooperation could be weakened in the process of averaging action payoffs under the imitating-successful-action rule, but that force remains dominant under the imitating-successful-player rule. Thus, full cooperation might flourish under the former rule.
The above strategy revision dynamics without mutation can be described as a Markov chain with the strategy profiles of all players as states. Each state is either transient or lies in a closed connected component and is thus called a stationary state. In particular, full cooperation and full defection are two typical absorbing states and are thus stationary states. The introduction of a mutation mechanism changes the landscape of the states. Each stationary state is now associated with a basin. The deeper the basin is, the longer the mutated process will stay in it. In other words, the LRE desired are those stationary states which have the deepest basin. Though complicated, computation of the basin depth can be done via the method of Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) . It turns out that, under the imitating-successful-action dynamics, the set of LRE and the convergence rate to equilibrium depend on the population size and on the payoff structure as well. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Two imitation rules are presented in Section 2. The associated results are demonstrated in Section 3. The method of Freidlin and Wentzell is briefly introduced in Section 4, and the proofs of our findings are given in Section 5.
The model
Our model is described as follows. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n ≥ 5, be the set of players. These players are assumed to sit sequentially and equally spaced around a circle. Each player has exactly two neighbors. For i ∈ N , let N i = {i − 1, i + 1} be the set of player i's neighbors. Note that player n + i is the same as player i by modulo n. At time period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, players meet with each of their two neighbors once to play the following PD game: 
When a > c, strategy D strictly dominates strategy C and (D, D) is the unique Nash equilibrium. When a = c, strategy D weakly dominates strategy C, and (D, D), (C, D), and (D, C)
are all Nash equilibria. Nevertheless, (C, C) yields higher payoff than (D, D) in both cases above. Accordingly, the state space S of our dynamic systems is the set of all players' strategy profiles. That is, S = {C, D} n with element s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ), where s i is the strategy adopted by player i ∈ N. For simplicity, label by C = (C, C, . . . , C) and D = (D, D, . . . , D) the states where all players cooperate and defect, respectively. In the beginning of each period, players' actions and payoffs that occurred (after mutation) in the last period are observable to their neighbors. Our local-interaction imitation dynamic system consists of two successive parts: imitation and mutation. In the imitation process, two rules are considered. In the first rule, each player i is assumed to imitate the most successful player, i.e. the player earning the highest total payoff among his neighbors and himself. More precisely, given state s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) ∈ S at time t, let z i (s) represent player i's total payoff after playing with each of his neighbors once at time t. It is easy to see that
Here n C i (s) = |{j ∈ N i : s j = C}| is the number of player i's neighbors choosing strategy C at time t. Accordingly, player i's next-period rational choice r i (s) satisfies
In the second rule, after playing with his neighbors, each player i is assumed to imitate the most successful action, i.e. the action yielding the highest average payoff which was adopted Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games 157 among his neighbors and himself at time t. Let δ be the Kronecker notation. Then
represents the average payoff for strategy E ∈ {C, D} among player i and his neighbors. Therefore, player i's next-period rational choice r i (s) satisfies
The computations of M i (s) in (2.3) andM i (s) in (2.5) involve the strategies taken by five consecutive players from i − 2 to i + 2. There are 32 cases in total to be considered in order to determine r i (s) from (2.3) or (2.5). Since 
. Some ambiguity occurs when M i (s) = {C, D} orM i (s) = {C, D}. For simplicity, we require in this paper that, by inertia, player i always sticks to his original strategy s i at time t whenever ambiguity occurs. Under this strict rule,
(2.7)
The loose rule that both {C, D} can be chosen as the rational choice r i (s) by setting
can be dealt with similarly, and the same results hold with slight modifications. The above imitation process induces a time-homogeneous Markov chain on S with its probability transition matrix Q 0 : S × S → [0, 1] given by Q 0 (s, u) = 1 or 0 depending on whether u = r(s) or not, respectively, (2.8) where r(s) = (r 1 (s), r 2 (s), . . . , r n (s)) is uniquely determined for state s ∈ S by (2.7). In particular, from (2.6) we have r(C) = C and r(D) = D. Hence, After completing the imitation process, players will simultaneously, but independently, alter their rational choices {r i (s)} with identical probability ε > 0, which is called the mutation rate and can be regarded as the probability of players'experimenting with new strategies. Altogether, our local-interaction imitation dynamics define a Markov chain {X t : t = 0, 1, . . .} on S with its probability transition matrix Q ε , a perturbation of Q 0 in (2.8), given by 12) where d(r(s), u) = |{i ∈ N : r i (s) = u i }| is the number of mismatches between the next truly adopted strategy u and the revised rational choice r(s) at state s. Because Q ε (s, u) > 0 for all s, u ∈ S, the mutation mechanism makes our dynamic process {X t } ergodic. Let µ ε be the associated unique invariant distribution, which is independent of the initial distribution and characterized by
(2.13)
We are interested in the limit probability distribution µ * := lim ε→0 µ ε , whose existence is shown in Section 5, and, in particular, whether C ∈ S * := {s ∈ S : µ * (s) > 0}, (2.14)
which means that full cooperation among players is possible in the long run. Elements in S * are called the stochastically stable states or LRE. Moreover, we are interested in the order estimate of E ε (T ), where
is the first time that {X t } hits S * with, say, the initial X 0 uniformly distributed on S. Letting ε ↓ 0 in (2.13), Vega-Redondo (2003, pp. 477-479) showed that µ * = µ * Q 0 and, thus, by (2.10),
As will be shown in Section 5, we will characterize S 0 first. Using the method of Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) , we are then able to find S * and the order estimate for E ε (T ).
The results
In order to specify S 0 , we first introduce some notation. Any state in the set
is called a mixed stationary state, which means that cooperators and defectors coexist peacefully. If M = ∅, any s ∈ M consists of some D-strings alternating with an equal number of C-strings as follows: Results for the imitation of the most successful player and action dynamics are presented in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, below, respectively. The proofs are given in Section 5. 
Theorem 3.1 demonstrates that full defection, D, is the unique long-run equilibrium of the imitation of the most successful player dynamics, though S 0 depends on whether a + b ≤ 2d or not. In the former case, Theorem 3.1(ii) shows that M defined in (3.1) is nonempty. Roughly speaking, the basin of attraction at state D is the largest one for the process {X t } and, thus, D becomes the unique long-run equilibrium as ε → 0. Theorem 3.1 also shows that the convergence rate to D has order ε −1 , which is independent of the game's payoff structure and population size.
Imitation of the most successful player dynamics without mutation has been used in Nowak and May (1992) , (1993), Nowak et al. (1994) , and Outkin (2003) to study evolutionary PD games on general spatial structures, such as two-dimensional lattices and the present onedimensional circle. Assuming that a = c = 0, d = 1, and 2 > b > 1, they showed that the set M of mixed stationary states is not empty, but they did not characterize it further. Theorem 3.2. Assume that (2.1), the imitation of the most successful action dynamics, (2.5) , and the strict rule (2.7) hold. 
for 6 ≤ n ≤ 20, (3.5)
Note that M 2,3 = ∅ if and only if 5 | n, where 5 | n means that n is a multiple of 5. In view of Theorem 3.1, it is no surprise to expect D to be the unique long-run equilibrium indicated in Theorem 3.2(i) and (iii). Yet, Theorem 3.2(ii) shows that, when a +b ≤ (c + 3d)/2 and (3a + b)/2 < c+d, S * varies as the population size n grows from {D} = S * for 5 ≤ n ≤ 20 to {D, C} ⊂ S * for 21 ≤ n ≤ 30 and finally to S * = (S 0 \ M 2,3 ) \{D} for n ≥ 31. In particular, full cooperation, C, instead of full defection, D, could emerge as a long-run equilibrium under the imitation of the most successful action dynamics when the number of players is over 30.
In the following we demonstrate why full cooperation could emerge as a long-run equilibrium under the imitation of the most successful action dynamics, but not under the imitation of the most successful player dynamics. Consider that a D-string having length greater than or equal to 3 confronts a C-string having length greater than or equal to 2. Then players' payoffs under the imitation of the most successful player dynamics are as follows:
Since
, the D-player on the boundary will win and hold. However, under the imitation of the most successful action dynamics, the average payoffs of strategies D and C are
on the boundary cannot be sustained; hence, the C-player will win and expand. This is because the force deviating from cooperation, i.e. payoff (b), is weakened in the process of averaging neighbors' payoffs. Accordingly, the states with a single D,
could be mixed stationary states under the imitation of the most successful action dynamics, but not under the imitation of the most successful player dynamics. By these mixed stationary states, fewer mutants are required to transfer states in M to C under the imitation of the most successful action dynamics than under the imitation of the most successful player dynamics. Hence, C could be the long-run equilibrium under the imitation of the most successful action dynamics, but not under the imitation of the most successful player dynamics. Next, our results are compared with those of Eshel et al. (1998) .
e. player i chooses strategy C. With this payoff function, the imitation of the most successful action dynamics has been studied in Eshel et al. (1998) , where players choosing strategies C and D are called altruists and egoists, respectively. Note that (2.1) implies that −1 < c < 0 and, thus, 0 < α < 2. It is easy to check that Theorem 3.2(i), (ii), and (iii) correspond to the cases α > 0.5, 0 < α < 0.5, and α = 0.5, respectively. For n ≥ 31 and 0 < α < 0.5, Eshel et al. (1998) showed that That is, only those states with the cooperator proportion no less than 0.6 could possibly be LRE. In particular, D ∈ S * . However, they could not decide whether C ∈ S * or M 2,3 ⊆ S * , as they lacked complete information about S 0 and S * . Note that M 2,3 ⊂ {s ∈ S : |{i ∈ N : s i = C}| ≥ 0.6n}. In contrast, Theorem 3.2 describes S * and S 0 explicitly for all PD game payoffs with population size no less than 5.
In comparison with Theorem 3.1 for the imitation of the most successful player dynamics, Theorem 3.2 shows that the convergence rate to S * under the imitation of the most successful action dynamics depends on the game payoff structure and population size. Robson and VegaRedondo (1996) showed that D is the unique long-run equilibrium, and its convergence rate has order ε −1 under the global interaction setup. Theorem 3.2(i) and (iii) show the same conclusion under the local interaction setup. However, Theorem 3.2(ii) indicates that, for 11 ≤ n ≤ 20, the convergence rate to S * = {D} has order ε −2 , which is slower than that under global interaction. This outcome is contrary to that of Ellison (1993) , who showed that the convergence rate to S * under local interaction is faster than that under global interaction when the best-reply dynamics were adopted. Moreover, Theorem 3.2(ii) shows that the convergence rate to S * has order ε −3 for n ≥ 31.
Finally, we remark that the method developed in this paper can be applied to other 2 × 2 symmetric games like the coordination games and other updating schemes, such as players matching their neighbors randomly for 1 ≤ v ≤ ∞ rounds. These results are reported in Chen et al. (2007a) , (2007b) and Chow and Wu (2009) . Note that, by the strong law of large numbers, the case in which v = ∞ is equivalent to players matching once with each of their two neighbors and is investigated in this paper. Theorem 3.2 is not so satisfactory, as full cooperation must coexist with other LRE. It is interesting to know whether full cooperation could prevail as the unique long-run equilibrium for other spatial structures like the two-dimensional lattices.
The method of Freidlin and Wentzell
Some terminologies are needed in order to describe the invariant distribution µ ε in (2.13). Let W be a subset of S. A graph g consisting of arrows u → v, where u ∈ S \ W and v ∈ S, is called a W -graph if it satisfies the following conditions: (i) every state in S \ W is the beginning of exactly one arrow; (ii) there exists a sequence of arrows leading from any state in S \ W to W . Or, equivalently, there are no cycles in the graph g.
Denote by G(W ) the set of all W -graphs. For any state s ∈ S, define
It is shown in Freidlin and Wentzell (1984, p. 177 
Since µ ε is the unique probability distribution satisfying (2.13), it follows that
Equation (4.2) holds for any time-homogeneous, irreducible, and aperiodic finite-state Markov chain. In general, it is not useful, as computing α s from (4.1) is difficult. However, from (2.12) we have, for any s, u ∈ S, 
By (4.2) and (4.4), µ * = lim ε→0 µ ε does exist and the following holds.
Theorem 4.1. The support S * of µ * defined in (2.14) is given by
In order to find the order estimate of E ε (T ) defined in (2.15), we need to generalize (4.5).
(4.7)
Let W k be any solution to v k above. Note that W 1 ⊆ S * . Since W k = S when k = |S|, W k ⊆ S * cannot always be valid unless S * = S. As will be shown in (5.9), below, this exceptional case does not fit our models discussed in Section 2.
Theorem 4.2. (Chiang and Chow (2007) .) Let T be as given in (2.15) . Then
The constant δ above means 'escape energy' in simulated annealing, which is a probabilistic algorithm for finding the global minima of combinatorial optimization problems. See Kirkpatrick et al. (1983) and Geman and Geman (1984) for an introduction on this topic. With this amount of energy, any state outside S * , the so-called 'global minima' set, could reach S * . See Chiang and Chow (1989) for how to obtain S * by the cycle method.
Regarding U(u, v) as the cost of going from u to v, then v({s}) means the minimum cost of all spanning trees with root at s. By (4.6), the set S * consists of those states in S which attain the minimum cost v 1 when treated as a root. Similarly, any solution W k to (4.7) represents an optimal choice for attaining v k , the minimum cost of all spanning forests with k roots on S. The quantity (v k − v k+1 ) is then the cost saved from having k roots to having k + 1 roots in constructing optimal spanning forests on S.
Proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2
In view of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, the method of Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) can be used to find the support S * and the order estimate of E ε (T ). The procedure is as follows.
Since S * ⊆ S 0 by (2.16), the first step is to find S 0 , which is the set of all stationary states under Q 0 . Let s ∈ S \S 0 be any transient state. In the case in which M = ∅, any s ∈ M has the form shown in (3.2). We need to find conditions on the d j and c j in (3.2) in order that s ∈ M.
The next step is to compute v({s}), the minimum-cost spanning tree rooted at s ∈ S, and solutions W k to (4.7). Then S * and E(T ε ) can be obtained via This is the key ingredient that makes the method of minimum-cost spanning forests efficient for determining S * and E(T ε ) via (4.6)-(4.8).
For convenience, we introduce the following notation: 
This verifies the remark after (4.7). Now we are ready to prove Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 for the imitation of the most successful player dynamics
Part (i): a + b > 2d. By symmetry and (2.1), it follows from Table 4 The former follows from (5.12) since U(C, s) = 1 for any state s with n C (s) = n − 1. Equation (5.12) also implies the latter, as the minimum-cost path from D to C is to jump directly to C at cost U(D, C) = n due to r(D) = D. Using (4.6) and (5.13), we easily obtain the desired conclusions: In fact, it will grow to a length greater than or equal to 3 under Q 0 and then can never be diminished by (5.16). Hence, any D-string in s ∈ M has length greater than or equal to 2. Putting together, M ⊆ M ≥2,≥3 and, thus, M = M ≥2,≥3 . It is also clear from the above arguments that r(s) = s for any s ∈ M. Together with (2.9), each state in S 0 is an absorbing state under Q 0 . Next we study how states in S 0 = M ∪ {C, D} communicate with each other in order to find v({s}) for s ∈ S 0 . Decompose M = M ≥2,≥3 as follows:
Here L = n/5 , where x denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to x. In particular,
We verify (5.6) in the following three steps. Remember that V (s) ≥ 1 for s ∈ S 0 by (5.5).
Step 1. Let s ∈ M k be as shown in (3.2). If
In words, one strategy C, marked by a '•', of the left state is mutated to a D strategy, also marked by a '•', and, thus, reaches the middle state s. The strategy where mutation occurs between s and the last state is marked by a '•'. All three states above lie in M k due to d i ≥ 3. Hereafter, we use a '•' to mark a certain player (or players) whose strategy might change in the process shown in the diagram. When necessary, '•' and ' * ' over a strategy are used to indicate where mutation occurs. Repeating the same procedures, any D-string in s can be trimmed to its minimum length 2 at the minimum cost 1 for each move while all the encountered states remain in M k . Note that the path is reversible at the same cost.
Step 2. Assume that 5 n or 1 ≤ k < L. For any s, u ∈ M k , there is a path in M k connecting s and u as follows: Step 3. Consider s ∈ M k with 1 ≤ k ≤ L. Using (5.20) in the case in which 5 | n and k = L, and using step 2 otherwise, we may assume without loss of generality that all c i = 3 in (3.2) for s. By (5.7) and (5.11),
Repeating the same procedure k − 1 times, we conclude that all states in M can reach D at the minimum cost 1 per state. This verifies (5.6).
It remains to study how C and D reach out. By (5.18), the following diagram is optimal for n = 5:
( 5.23) Similarly, we have the following optimal path for n ≥ 6:
Hence, V (C) =1 for n ≥ 5. On the other hand, (5.17) implies that the following path is optimal for D to reach out: We obtain the first equation above by requiring that all states in M ∪ {D} converge to u in (5.23) or (5.24), and then from u to C at cost 2. Hence, v 1 = v({D}) = |M| + 1, S * = {D}, and µ ε (C) ≈ ε 3 by (4.6). Then k 0 = 2 in (4.8) as v 2 = v({s, D}) = |M| for any s ∈ M 1 ∪ {C}. Finally, δ = v 1 − v 2 = 1, as desired.
Proof of Theorem 3.2 for the imitation of the most successful action dynamics
Remember that (5.7) and (5.8) remain valid. Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix A imply that the rational choice r(s) defined in (2.7) depends on the relative magnitudes of a+b, (3a + b)/2, c+d, and (c + 3d)/2. Note that, under (2.1), Table 4 and (5.26), (5.10) holds. In the subcase (3a + b)/2 ≥ c + d, the results in Table 3 and (5.26) imply that (5.11) holds. As in Theorem 3.1(i), any D-string in a mixed state s will grow by absorbing its neighboring Cs. As a consequence, (5.12) holds.
For the remaining subcase (3a + b)/2 < c + d, we now show that (5.12) still holds. Instead of (5.11), from the results in Table 3 .7), (5.10), and (5.27), any D-string with length less than or equal to 2 in a mixed state s will absorb its two neighboring Cs and, thus, form a D-string of length greater than or equal to 3 in the next period under Q 0 . Similarly, we have, for d ≥ 3,
Here and hereafter, any * = C or D and is undecidable at present. Moreover,
It follows that any D-string with length greater than or equal to 3 in a mixed state s will grow in the next period or in one more period later under Q 0 . By repeating the same procedures, this verifies (5.12) for the subcase (3a
By (2.11) and (5.1), S 0 = {C, D}. As in Theorem 3.1(i), (5.13) holds and then (5.14) follows.
Part (ii): a + b ≤ (c + 3d)/2 and (3a + b)/2 < c + d. By the results in Table 3 we still have (5.27), which means that any D-string of length greater than or equal to 3 will diminish at the next period under Q 0 if surrounded by nonsingleton C-strings. Because of this property, the structure of S 0 is complicated, as indicated in (3.3). The results in Table 4 (S2) Any C-string in a state s ∈ M must have length greater than or equal to 3. Statement (S2) holds because (5.7), (5.15), and (5.27) imply that any C-string with length less than or equal to 2 in a state s will be eliminated at the next period, as shown in
28) and (5.29), below. Here each ' * ' can be C or D. Though some new Cs could be generated, which can happen by (5.27) if the C-string is of length 2 and is confronted with a D-string with 168 H.-C. CHEN AND Y. CHOW length greater than or equal to 3, they are always isolated and will disappear in the next period:
(S3) Any D-string in a state s ∈ M must have length 1, 2, or 3.
By (S1) and (S2), we may assume that all C-strings encountered hereafter have length greater than or equal to 3. By (5.27), any D-string with length d ≥ 3 in s ∈ M will shrink by 2 per period under Q 0 . So its length will drop to 1 or 2 at some stage. By (5.15) and (5.27), a D-string of length 2 can hold under Q 0 , while a singleton D-string will grow by (5.7) and (5.15) to length 3 and then back to length 1 again:
Hence, d can be only 1, 2, or 3.
(S4) Equation (3.3) holds for any state s ∈ M.
Suppose that s ∈ M is as shown in (3.2) with d i = d i+1 = 1. By (5.7) and (5.15),
Since u ∈ M by (S1), we have c i − 2 ≥ 3 by (S2). That is, c i ≥ 5. This verifies (3.3) for 1) . The other cases can be treated similarly and the details are thus omitted.
(S5) The following diagram shows M is indeed what we claimed: 
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Unless s goes to D, the length of any D-string in s will become 1, 2, or 3 under Q 0 .
(S7) Any C-string with length greater than or equal to 5 in a state s ∈ S can never be eliminated under Q 0 .
If not increased, its length could decrease at most by 2 under Q 0 .
(S8) Let s ∈ M be as given in (3.2). For any i, Now we are ready to find S * . In view of the statements in Theorem 3.2(ii), part (ii) is much more complicated to prove than part (i). Though still valid, (5.6) is inadequate for our purpose.
For any s, u ∈ S 0 , we need to find a minimum-cost path γ = {s 0 = s, s 1 , . . . , s = u} from s to u. We will show in the following steps that there exists a γ with each U(s i , s i+1 ) = 1 if s i ∈ S 0 and s i+1 ∈ F (s i ), 0 otherwise, (5.35) first for s, u in some M k and then for states in {C} ∪ M \ M 2,3 . Finally, we will show how D communicates with other states. Note that the path γ is certainly optimal in view of (5.1) and (5.5).
Step 1. Statement (5.35) holds for any s, u ∈ M k under the condition that
Moreover, the path γ in (5.35) lies entirely in M k and is reversible. Roughly speaking, the above means that all states in M k are 'equivalent' to each other under condition (5.36).
Because the path γ above is required to be reversible, it suffices to verify the claim for any u ∈ M k ∩ M 2,≥3 . That is, all its D-strings have length 2. As will now be shown, this can be further weakened. By (5.36) and (S9)-(S10), there are at least min(5, n − 5L) ≥ 1 extra Cs in u. Hence, some c i ≥ 4 in representation (3.2) for u. Let v, w ∈ M k be exactly as u except that the lengths from the ith D-string to the (i + 1)th C-string are (2, c i , 1, c i+1 + 1) and (2, c i − 1, 2, c i+1 + 1), respectively. Then
This means that we can shift any extra C in a C-string of u to its right C-string while fulfilling the claim. By symmetry, this extra C can also be shifted to its left C-string. Repeating the same procedures, all the extra Cs in u can be arbitrarily relocated among its k C-strings, while all encountered states are in M k and fulfill the claim. Hence, it suffices to verify the claim for some u ∈ M k ∩ M 2,≥3 .
Let s ∈ M k be as in (3.2). By (S3), there are nine possibilities for any (d i , d i+1 ) . By symmetry and (5.30), it suffices to consider the following two cases:
Let us start with case (a). Suppose that some
Not only does v ∈ M k by (3.3) but also the size d j of its j th D-string equals d j for any 
where w ∈ M k and the size d j of its j th D-string equals d j for any 1 ≤ j ≤ k except d i+1 = 2. Repeating the same procedures, we will find a reversible path from s to some u ∈ M k ∩ M 2,≥3 as claimed.
By (5.37), it remains to consider the case in which 
By (3.3), m ∈ M k with the length of its ith D-string being 2. Hence, m satisfies case (a). We have just shown above that there is a desired, reversible path from m to some u ∈ M k ∩ M 2,≥3 . Putting together, this completes the proof of step 1.
Step 2. Let M 0 = {C}. For n ≥ 6 and 1 ≤ k ≤ L, (5.35) holds for any s ∈ M k \ M 2,3 and u ∈ M k−1 . Moreover, (5.35) holds for u ∈ M k \ M 2,3 and s ∈ M k−1 as well.
Note that M 2,3 ⊆ M L and M 2,3 = ∅ if and only if 5 | n. By step 1, it suffices to consider some u ∈ M k−1 . We first treat the case in which (5.36) holds. By step 1 again we may assume that all d j = 2 except a certain d i = 1 in representation (3.2) for s. Note that such s exist under (5.36). So both c i−1 , c i ≥ 4 by (3.3). The conclusion is implied by the following diagram:
(5.38) Note that u ∈ M k−1 by (3.3) and the path above is nearly reversible in the sense that s d appears only in the path from s to u.
It remains to consider the case in which 5 | n and k = L = n/5. By (S9)-(S10), any s ∈ M L \ M 2,3 has the form shown in (5.34). A diagram similar to (5.38) works for such s.
Step 3. For n ≥ 6, (5.35) holds for any s, u
By varying k from L to 1 in step 2, the conclusion follows. Now we consider M 2,3 .
Step 4. For n ≥ 6, (5.35) holds for any s ∈ M 2,3 and u ∈ M L−1 . But the minimum cost to reach M 2,3 from S 0 \ M 2,3 is 2 instead of 1.
Since n ≥ 6 and M 2,3 = ∅ if and only if 5 | n, we have L = n/5 ≥ 2. Then, by (5.15) and (5.27), 
It remains to consider how D communicates with other states. The cases in which n = 5 and n ≥ 6 will be treated separately in the following two steps.
Step 5. Consider the case in which (3.4)-(3.8) hold for n = 5. In this case, L = n/5 = 1 and M = M 1 = M 2,3 . Different from (5.39), we simply have
(5.40)
The last move is optimal as we have shown in (S2) that any C-string with length less than or equal to 2 in a state will be eliminated under Q 0 , which implies that D cannot reach any other state in S 0 at cost less than or equal to 2. By using (S6), (5.15), and (5.27), the optimal path to reach in and out of C is as follows: Step 6. Consider the case in which (3.4)-(3.8) hold for n ≥ 6. By using (5.15) and (5.27), D can reach out at the minimum cost 3, as in (5.40): 
